Contested Meanings, Myths and Hyperimages of the Apocalypse: The Bakhtin Circle and the Politicisation of Catastrophism by Roberts, JM & Cremin, C
1 
 
Contested meanings, myths and hyperimages of the apocalypse: the 
Bakhtin Circle and the politicisation of catastrophism 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article considers the depoliticising effects of current images and myths of 
apocalyptic visions, such that the world faces a catastrophe whether this emerges from 
environmental degradation, mass migration, terrorism, or global financial collapse. In 
our digital media age, apocalyptic images are now also captured through the raw 
footage of actual disaster events. In the article we call such footage, ‘hyperimages’. 
The power of the hyperimage is not, as Baudrillard once said, that reality is ‘just like 
the movies’, rather, hyperimages demonstrate that the image captured and shown to 
others is all too real because they depict actual everyday disasters. Importantly, such 
is the power of hyperimages that they are often employed by the political right to help 
them construct a hegemonic project aiming to win state power and to influence state 
policies. Drawing on the Bakhtin Circle, however, we show that hyperimages are also 
mediated and circulated through a multitude of social groups and voices in society, 
which contain seeds of radical heteroglossic alternatives to that of the right. Following 
this, the paper then examines how responses to apocalyptic hyperimages can be 
politicised in a progressive direction. 
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Whether it is the arms race or orders given to start a war that is itself 
dominated by that economy of speed throughout all the zones of its 
technology, a gap of a few seconds may decide, irreversibly, the fate of what 
is still now and then called humanity – plus the fate of a few other species.  
Jacques Derrida (1984: 22-31)  
 
The decade of the ’00s was punctuated with political crises and images of human-
engendered disaster in prosperous, developed countries: 9/11, the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, the global financial crisis, Fukushima and the Occupy Movement. 
Doom is prophesised not only by the usual cranks and cults, but also by blockbuster 
spectacles, ecological scientists, and in a more nuanced way by economists and 
hirsute Marxist theorists (Dixon 2003; George 2010; Žižek 2010). As the UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in September 2014 said, the ‘world is living in an era 
of unprecedented level of crises’ (Borger 2014). In one respect ‘crises’ are all too real. 
Reality is nonetheless mediated and not least by how the mind interprets what is an 
‘apocalyptic age’, or what others similarly call ‘an age of catastrophism’. 
Encapsulating both the left and right, those who say we live in apocalyptic and 
catastrophic times tend to believe we exist in a state of collapse and disorder shaped 
by the likes of economic crises, political upheavals, environmental degradation, 
terrorist threats, and so on. Such turmoil will eventually give rise to a new society, but 
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first people need to stir from their slumber to see the calamity that surrounds them 
(Lilley 2012, 1).1 
Of course, today our political apocalyptic imaginary is informed and 
formulated by words, Hollywood spectacle and actual footage of disasters that those 
in the midst of them capture on their mobile devices and upload onto YouTube. 
Whether the image is generated by CGI or is reality captured, seen through a screen 
fiction and reality become interchangeable and in degrees mythologised. Nonetheless, 
the images we have in mind are all too real in that what they represent can literally 
escape the frame and consume, even kill, the viewer. Consider, for example, a person 
recording an approaching tsunami on their mobile phone. The screen they see the 
image through presents the same image that someone watching the unfolding 
catastrophe will see on YouTube (assuming it is uploaded onto it). For the taker, 
however, the image can literally escape the frame and kill them. The viewer watching 
the scene at a distance on their computer monitor is not in imminent danger, such 
images nonetheless also threaten ultimately also to escape the frame. They are 
signifiers of an empirically verifiable reality that, within a ‘genre’ of apocalyptic 
images from actual footage of tsunamis through to Hollywood spectacle, forewarn of 
catastrophes that will sooner or later consume us if we are passive to what is 
represented by them. The crucial issue is how these images are translated. What, in 
other words, do we ‘make’ of them and how does this impact, if at all, on our politics. 
In this article we wish to interrogate how material reality is mediated through 
                                                        
1  To give one illustration, there are the obscurantist fantasies about a ‘coming 
apocalypse’ that would end all divisions, and possibly end human life, which is seen 
as a cancer on nature, or lead to a pastoral future without modern industry. Derrick 
Jensen (2006), for instance, suggests that global warming will serendipitously bring 
about the collapse of industrial civilization and reduce global population to 10 per 




ideological interpretation, distortion and myth. We aim to disentangle myth from 
reality while also – and this is the political task – exploring the utopian kernel of the 
ineluctable symbolic renderings of our ‘end times’.  
To begin to critically and theoretically explore these apocalyptical images our 
paper starts by looking at the relationship between ideological myth and reality, 
primarily because many apocalyptic images also endeavour to create a myth about a 
society’s past, its present and its future. In this respect, we first discuss some 
perspectives on myths, which argue that myths produce ideological narratives in 
society on behalf of dominant groups. Roland Barthes is arguably the most well-
known proponent of this position. For all of their brilliant insights, however, these 
perspectives nevertheless tend to have negative views of myths, seeing them as tools 
for the dominant to maintain hegemony over the mases. These initial critical 
observations enable us to move to an alternative theory of myth as found in the work 
of the Bakhtin Circle. Language for the Bakhtin Circle is rendered dead or 
monoglossic when refracted through the prism of a dominant ideology, but rendered 
alive when subjected to the heteroglossia of competing ‘accents’. Language is 
contextual, textual, intertextual and historically mediated at different levels of 
abstraction. Language cannot be understood without consideration of the historical 
context in which utterances are made and received, along with the different histories 
of interlocutors. Dialogue does not happen in a void (Bakhtin 1981, 291). Similarly, 
for the Bakhtin Circle, myths can be monologic or heteroglossic; myths both help to 
articulate dominant ideals and provide spaces for people to use myths to assert their 
own everyday images against dominant ones.  
It is through this materialist and dialectical approach that we subject current 
‘end-of-the-world’ images to a critical intelligibility. We examine how crises are 
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themselves often mythologised in the apocalyptic accounts of our age. In particular, 
movements of the right articulate their own specific tales of catastrophism within 
society in order to capture and then mobilise state hegemony and power for their own 
political and social ends. This starting point enables us to ground an analysis of how a 
mass franchised and disseminated apocalyptic spectacle is reproduced through the 
optics of what we shall refer here to as the hyperimage (cf. Cremin 2015). This 
involves an examination of the homologies between cinematic and TV spectacle and 
the spectacular instances of real life disaster, catastrophe and so forth captured by 
witnesses on the scene using mobile technologies, disseminated and downloaded in 
montage through social media. As the Soviet documentary film-maker Dziga Vertov’s 
kino-eye manifesto stated, some 80 or so years before the cine-camera was integrated 
into pocket size mass produced commodities, the power of film-making becomes 
more prominent when it lies in the hands of ordinary people who make images 
concrete. This is now realised with the hyperimage and the concretisation of 
spectacle, as if the spectacle itself is the doppelganger in a frame one thought a mirror 
that crosses the glass threshold and, as it were, punches the spectator in the face.  
We then consider how material events and processes that signal or forewarn of 
the empirical possibility of universal catastrophe captured by those on the scene of 
terrorist attacks, tsunamis and so forth, are depoliticised by the unified monologic 
accent of a catastrophic  narrative, as witness in entertainment media and the state. 
The problem, in other words, is not that these images, whether of actual events of 
fictionalised apocalyptic and dystopian scenarios commonplace in spaces such as 
Hollywood cinema, are ‘pure fantasy’, or images layered upon other images, the 
‘hyperreal’ as Baudrillard calls it, but rather that their truth substance is depoliticised. 
That is to say, the futures they depict are already determined by an incapacity to 
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counter them through actions that anticipate alternative scenarios. We argue that one 
way in which monologic apocalyptic images attempt to gain hegemony is through 
state power. As a materialist approach to makes clear, and as we argue throughout the 
article, the struggle for determination of the image is therefore not something that 
happens ‘merely’ in the sphere of culture. It is by necessity as struggle on the terrain 
of state power. We then make some concluding observations.  
 
 
Myths as dialogic forms 
 
Famously, Roland Barthes (2009) argued that myths are ways of naturalising events 
in the world. Myths transform the flow and contested quality of history into frozen 
time. Myths act as if they create concepts to represent the flow of history, rather than, 
as is the case, history creating concepts. As such, myths present a particular 
ideological viewpoint as being impartial and common sense, which is a way of 
stemming the tide of debate. As a ‘metalanguage’, myths conceal how ideological 
viewpoints are constructed by presenting us with a distorted image of a particular 
aspect of the world. A mythical image, for example, will claim that an object holds a 
specific essence, a truth perhaps, which it actually lacks. According to Mosco, 
therefore, ‘myths are stories that animate individuals and societies by providing paths 
to transcendence that lift people out of the banality of everyday life. They offer an 
entrance to another reality, a reality once characterized by the promise of the sublime’ 
(Mosco 2004, 3). Myths are not falsehoods as such, but provide a way for people to 
overcome certain contradictions they face in their daily lives. In this respect, myths 
help us to manage these contradictions by reinterpreting them through cultural 
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objects, jokes, music, narratives, stories, and so on. ‘In this respect, myths transform 
the messy complexities of history into the pristine gloss of nature’ (Mosco 2004, 30) 
and present solutions that help to make existing social contradictions seem natural.  
According to Samuel and Thompson (1990), such views about myths lack a 
certain analytical purchase on how everyday life actually operates. They argue that 
instead of seeing myths as perpetuating ideological viewpoints which naturalise 
certain contradictions, it is of equal importance to ascertain how myths offer up points 
of resistance to dominant ideologies. Myths can always be employed by ordinary 
people at new events in order to combat dominant beliefs. Portelli (1990) gives a case 
in point. When interviewing an old Italian communist about his past political 
activities, Portelli discovered that the elderly man attributed an old popular saying – 
‘when the thrush flies by, then is the time to shoot it’ – to Lenin. For Portelli, the old 
man used this myth to imagine what might have occurred if certain historical events 
had not taken place in the Italian Communist Party, which had led it to move away 
from Leninism and then to eventually be defeated at successive elections. The myth 
gave the old man hope through an alternative discourse to the one then prevalent in 
the Communist Party leadership. As such, a ‘myth may…take us closer to past 
meanings and certainly to subjectivity than…the painstaking accumulation of fact’ 
(Samuel and Thompson 1990, 13). Myths are thus more fluid than Barthes’s or 
Mosco’s description of them. 
From the discussion so far, it seems to be the case some see myth as a useful 
analytical tool with which to discuss ideology, while others criticise this perspective 
for not appreciating how myths can be used to analyse ideology. One fruitful avenue 
through which to reconcile these two contrasting perspectives is by means of the work 
of the Bakhtin Circle. Indeed, Bakhtin discusses the use of myths in relation to 
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everyday language. He does this, first, by criticising the ideological use to which 
myths are employed. He says that mythical images bond with a ‘feeling’ evident in 
specific forms and stylistic combinations of language, and when this occurs a myth 
‘substitutes itself for the connections and interrelationships of reality itself’ (Bakhtin 
1981, 369). In this instance, myths ‘fetter’ the images found in everyday life by 
stifling the ‘wider application’ and ‘greater flexibility’ that these images might 
otherwise have in everyday life. As a result, myths ‘limit the word’s potential for 
greater expressiveness’ (Bakhtin 1981, 369). For example, myths often place time in 
an ‘eternal contemporaneity’ that create discursive genres without any real sense of 
renewal, where one might live in the present but do so by always referring back to a 
mythical past where one’s identity is thought to be rooted in (Bakhtin 1984, 105-106). 
This is a monologic perspective on the world that aims to impart a unified meaning 
upon the lived experience of subordinate groups (Bakhtin 1981, 270; Bakhtin and 
Medvedev 1991, 159).  
Yet, while Bakhtin appears to outline a theory of myths that is comparable to 
Barthes and others of a similar persuasion, he also recognises the dialogic nature of 
myths. For Bakhtin, society is comprised of contradictions that people face in their 
daily lives, and these contradictions give rise to ‘heteroglossic’ speech diversity in 
daily encounters. Heteroglossia thereby gives expression to the popular culture and 
experiences of centrifugal forces in society. And it is this heteroglossic potential 
which, according to Bakhtin, can help to ‘de-centre’ myths. This occurs when 
heteroglossia makes a myth lose its sealed-off and self-sufficient character, when a 
myth ‘becomes conscious of itself as only one among other cultures and languages’ 
(Bakhtin 1981, 370). At this point, heteroglossia starts to seep into the monologic 
form of a myth to reveal the dialogic nature of its mythical tendencies. Unitary 
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meaning begins to decay, while the decentred language of heteroglossia starts to 
express the contradictions of life in the public sphere, finding support for these views 
in the once mythical unitary language of monologic discourse (Bakhtin 1981, 147). 
For Bakhtin, then, myths are not merely ideological but also reveal an alternative to 
dominant ideologies, which is the heteroglossic potential to reveal an alternative 
future to a monologic present defined by a static past. In the next sections, we apply 
these Bakhtinian insights to dialogue in and around apocalyptic discourse. 
 
 
Mythical crises of the apocalypse  
 
Apocalypses have their material provenance in crises but are not mutually exclusive 
(cf. Boyer 1992, 23). Reality precedes prophecy, and prophesy authors the future. 
Apocalyptic prophecies can be comforting – if they tell of apocalypse befalling one’s 
enemies. Apocalypses prophesied in the Bible offered hope to the persecuted: ‘great 
hailstones, fire and brimstone’ awaited the Babylonian invaders holding siege to and 
sacking the city of Jerusalem (The Book of Ezekiel). Plagues, sores, great whores and 
a blood-drenched moon were in store for the Roman Imperial System in The 
Revelation of John, written during the reign of Emperor Domitian in 81-86AD. 
Beliefs in the apocalypse are therefore found in many cultures throughout history. As 
we argue below, what is unique about our times is that numerous individuals who, 
through the likes of social media, can project these images around the world frame 
apocalyptic images. In this sense, we have become spectators at a crucial historical 
juncture. The question we thus pose is whether the apocalyptic imaginary can be 
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politicised, especially when apocalyptic speculation is typically but not exclusively 
produced by the mass entertainment industry.  
To gain some answers, let us start with Evan Calder Williams’s observation 
that an apocalypse can be distinguished from crisis, the former revelatory and 
redemptive. In contrast, crises, says Williams, are circular in nature, restoring a 
former state (Williams 2011). Unlike Williams, and following Bakhtin, we see crises 
and apocalypses as often being entwined with one another. During a crisis, a myth is 
able to (mis)represent the past cause of crisis. Crises operating in particular spaces are 
captured by myths, which then support ideological monologic apocalyptic images. 
Another way of thinking of apocalypses in this respect is through Bakhtin’s idea that 
crises often occur in thresholds between points. In everyday life, notes Bakhtin, 
people go through routine and expected occurrences, which happen in local space-
time contexts. In the home, one experiences everyday life at certain ‘points’ – a 
stairway, a foyer, a landing. Often, these ‘points’ go unnoticed (Bakhtin 1984, 169). 
However, ‘points’ can suddenly be transformed into ‘crisis-time’, which pushes 
everyday ‘points’ of life out of joint. What was once ordinary becomes a moment for 
a new awareness and a change of fate, a place where time reaches crisis-proportions 
and where ‘everything is taken to its extreme’ (Bakhtin 1984, 167).  
A crisis is thereby revelatory under Bakhtin’s understanding and, importantly, 
a moment to devise new words and signs to make sense of it. But these do not 
necessarily result in heteroglossic subversion. They can also be refracted through 
monologic agendas, particularly through myths. After all, myths have the potential to 
invert the flow of time. Present and past in myths tend to have more importance over 
the future so that ‘everything affirmative, ideal, obligatory, desired has been shifted, 
via the inversion, into the past’ (Bakhtin 1981). These myths are monologic insofar 
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that they design a past to herald an invented, eternal Golden Age as being superior to 
alternatives in the present and future possibilities. They thereby construct mythical 
revelatory themes to regulate present and future beliefs and behaviour (Bakhtin 1981, 
148). Myths are thus similar to what the social historian Eric Hobsbawm terms, 
‘invented traditions’, which aim to inculcate ‘certain values and norms of behaviour 
by repetition which automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawn 1983, 
1). Tradition must build a number of rituals that at least appear to have been handed 
down through generations since time immemorial, such as the wigs and robes worn 
by judges in a court of law (Hobsbawn 1983).   
So, while it is true to say, as Benjamin Noys (2012, 13) notes, that crises, in 
our present day, are ‘revelatory of the ontology of capital’, it is equally true to say 
these revelations happen against the grain of newly created monologic mythical 
utterances that do not necessarily produce the circumstances for genuine critical 
dialogue about the nature of global capitalism. Neoliberal states, for example, have 
used doomsday scenarios about the 2008 global financial crisis as an opportunity to 
continue to generate and sustain a further set of myths about welfare scroungers in 
new areas of society, in new social thresholds, even in unexpected ones. Drawing on 
the British Attitudes Survey, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation underlines the extent to 
which neoliberal ideology has imparted a unified meaning to the current crisis in 
different thresholds of society. There is a ‘general trend’, they claim, of blaming the 
individual rather than society for poverty. In 1986, 41 per cent of Labour supporters 
attributed poverty to social injustice. By 2010, almost two years after the global 
financial crisis, just 27 per cent of Labour voters cite social injustice as the main 
cause (NatCen Social Research 2013). As reported in the Guardian, in 2011, 31 per 
cent of Labour supporters claimed welfare recipients were ‘undeserving’, higher than 
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in 1987 when at the height of Thatcherism 21 per cent agreed with this statement 
(Ramesh 2013). Under these circumstances, thresholds of crisis align themselves with 
certain myths, in the above case a myth of the undeserving poor leeching off the 
welfare state, which can soon result in reproducing wider apocalyptic myths, such as 
those related to doomsday scenarios about immigrants scrambling to get the ‘best’ 
jobs in ‘our’ country. Importantly, these apocalyptic myths are employed by forces of 
the political right to articulate their own ‘solutions’ to these constructed ‘worsening 
conditions’, which are then used to strengthen neoliberal state power. As Davis 
perceptively notes in respect to the USA: 
By intensifying paranoia and division about immigrants, welfare, external and 
internal security threats, fiscal crises, morality, and minorities, the organized 
right works to generate a climate in which the state can ‘react’ to various 
supposed crises…Border security is just one example where agitation from the 
right has contributed to the state’s militarization of the US-Mexico border, and 
the growth of a massive internal security apparatus (Davis 2012: 79).   
 
We will return later on in the article to the relationship between the apocalypse 
and the state. Before we do so, however, we need first to develop some theoretical 
points in order to analyse how apocalyptic myths assume specific forms in our 
information age. After all, monological myths profit these days from what Paul 
Virilio (2005) calls the ‘information bomb’, a fallout from the white noise of 
information overload via our digital age. In this context, images become a means to 
further apocalyptic myths and for them to gain intelligibility in society. At the same 
time, and as we argue below, digital culture has the potential to turn these myths into 
what we term are ‘hyperimages’. These are images in which reality seeps through 
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media forms to threaten us, but which also have the potential to show us alternative 
realities to those articulated by the powerful in society. Hyperimages are thus 
different to the hyperreal. The latter represents the hegemony of images, whereas 
hyperimages, in a Bakhtinian sense, provide an insight into a plethora of symbolic, 
heteroglossic accents. Metaphorically speaking, the hyperreal society, immobilised, 
observes through media forms the tsunami that fast approaches, despite the fact a 
‘solution’ does indeed lie in escape up the nearby hill, whereas some, but not all, 
hyperimages can point us towards the path up the hill. Critical theory must seek, then, 
to overcome such depoliticised hyperreal images in order to bring the political back 
into a dialogic space. We now begin to address this issue. 
 
 
Mythical apocalyptic hyperimages  
 
According to Voloshinov (1973, 23), units of ideological meaning, or signs, that are 
‘withdrawn from the pressures of the social struggle…inevitably lose…force, 
degenerating into allegory and becoming the object not of live social intelligibility but 
of philological comprehension’. These signs evade contact with heteroglossic culture 
and instead become monologic words. Words such as ‘crisis’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘end 
times’ and ‘apocalypse’ are often illustrations of monologic signs in this respect to the 
extent that they become withdrawn from the pressures of social struggle. The 
apocalyptic sign, for example, becomes a sterile one when it is given an eternal 
identity through the banal statement that every age is an apocalyptic one. We need, 
then, to bring such signs to life, subjecting them to ‘live intelligibility’ and in so doing 
think the possibility of different futures to that forewarned by ecological scientists and 
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made entertainment by the culture industry. We need, in other words, to overcome 
what Fredric Jameson (2012, 105) notes is an ‘incapacity to integrate a future of time 
into our own analysis of current society’, which ‘accounts for the tendency of 
bourgeois thought to alternate between images of regression or dystopian collapse, 
and conceptions of progress which amount to little more than the perfecting of what is 
there already’.  
Bakhtin’s further distinction between symbol and image is instructive in this 
respect. He says that a symbol is a unit of semiotic meaning that connotes the world in 
some way or another. As the world has indefinite meanings, a symbol likewise has 
indefinite contextual meanings as it becomes refracted into an array of heteroglossic 
themes. This is because belief systems gain ideological potency by being realised in a 
plethora of ‘words, actions, clothing, manners, and organisations of people and things 
– in a word: in some definite semiotic material’ (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1991, 7). 
Symbols thus enjoy endless material references and produce awareness in people 
about the world that, up until that point, they did not possess. By way of contrast, 
images are limited in scope, and demand merely understanding of ‘significance in the 
given context’ (Bakhtin 1986, 160) in which they have been created. That is to say, 
images have yet to stimulate endless contextual meaning and therefore lack true 
dialogic potentiality.  
In terms of the apocalypse, the distinction between the symbolic and image is 
useful in developing an interesting take on how myths around crises, disasters, 
traumas and catastrophes, which come to be refracted in entertainment media, on 
YouTube clips and through media images on climate change, capitalism and so forth, 
are analysed by critical thinkers. Focus momentarily on how Baudrillard describes a 
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particular apocalyptic event. Writing on the 9/11 attacks, Baudrillard described the 
ambiguous nature of real-life footage: 
The role of images is highly ambiguous. For they capture the event (take it as 
hostage) at the same time as they glorify it. They can be infinitely multiplied, 
and at the same time act as a diversion and a neutralization (as happened for 
the events of May 68). One always forgets that when one speaks of the 
‘danger’ of the media. The image consumes the event, that is, it absorbs the 
latter and gives it back as consumer goods. Certainly the image gives to the 
event an unprecedented impact, but as an image-event (Baudrillard 2003, 27; 
see also Baudrillard 2010).  
 
For Baudrillard, such images have become immersed in the hyperreal. Here, the 
hyperreal denotes a flattened reality indistinguishable from the image that represents 
it. It is, he says, the ‘real’ which ‘is not only that which can be reproduced, but that 
which is always already reproduced: the hyperreal’ (Baudrillard 1993, 73).  
When Baudrillard provocatively stated that the first Gulf War during 1990-
1991 had not taken place, what he was referring to of course was the way war is now 
filtered and relayed through images drained of reference to bloodshed akin to 
videogames where the eye sees from the perspective of the missile and is shut at the 
point of impact. Actual violence and destruction was something that occurred to other 
people in another place, although, as Baudrillard correctly pointed out, it was hardly a 
war when ground troops were largely absent and the adversaries so imbalanced. In 
this instance, then, the image-event fashions reality. More broadly, Baudrillard says 
that our digital age provides the context for hyperreality to thrive. Life becomes coded 
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through 0s and 1s and the constant modelling of human and social reality through 
digital technology (Baudrillard 1993, 58).  
In terms of disasters, much has already written about how popular culture 
provided the fantasy frame for the 9/11 event, the most uncanny of which was an 
episode of the X-File spin-off The Lone Gunman, broadcast in early 2001, where 
terrorists having taken possession of a passenger jet liner attempted to steer it into the 
World Trade Center (see also Žižek 2002). Such subterranean fantasies and 
forebodings are realised by the singular sublime moments they foreshadow. The 9/11 
event was filmed by many of the people contingently there at the scene and many 
were posted online. Their clips were subsequently put together in a real time sequence 
for the made-for-television documentary 102 Minutes that Changed America. Close-
ups of faces contorted by the trauma were interspersed with images of the towers 
billowing smoke and harrowing close-ups of people hanging from the windows. 
Panning shots of office workers and tourists running from the scene, policemen 
guiding them towards safety past shops and via commercial thoroughfares, evoked 
Baudrillard’s hyperreal. Indeed, it is as if by situating oneself behind a lens reality is 
drained of its authenticity thereby restoring the hyperreal in which the taker of the 
shot is no longer a correspondent but only an observer. We escape reality by 
fictionalising it and also make it more real than real – a hyperreal – in the camera 
obscura of a Hollywood imaginary.  
There is a sense, though, in which Baudrillard’s albeit fascinating insights into 
hyperreality only take us so far in deciphering images of the apocalypse. The problem 
with Baudrillard’s analysis is he thinks that reality has become a ‘game’ in which 
‘reality’ is now simulated through codes. Ultimately, then, Baudillard stays at the 
level of the image, or its near equivalence in the dominance of signs, such as ‘the sign 
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of behaviour models inscribed everywhere in the media or in the layout of the city’ 
(Baudrillard 1993, 78). In Bakhtinian terms, this is a monologic theory of the sign 
because it suggests ‘social control by means of prediction, simulation, programmed 
anticipation and inderminate mutation’ governs social life (Baudrillard 199, 60). This 
form of social control obliterates ‘internal contradictions’ through its ability to code 
and control social life (Baudrillard 1993, 60), and it thereby denies the heteroglossic 
potential of other signs and ‘accents’ to open new thresholds to critique hyperreal 
images. To regain a more nuanced critical analysis we therefore need to move beyond 
Baudrillard’s overreliance on a monologic theory of the sign and image. Again, in 
more Bakhtinian language, we need to explore how images are not only monologic, 
but are also integrally related to the symbolic and its refractions of internal 
contradictions in society (see Harvey 2014 for good discussion of some internal 
contradictions of capitalism).  
Susan Buck-Morss’ idea is useful in thinking how the symbolic can emerge 
through the image. She notes that when relayed through global media, for example, an 
image acquires the form akin to what Susan Buck-Morss calls the inverse 
simulacrum.  
If there is a simulation produced by television, it lies on the other side of the 
apparatus. It is the simulated ‘whole world’ that watches, the virtual collective 
assembled in cyberspace, of which viewers, sharing the same televisual 
experience, imagine themselves to be a part (Buck-Morss 2002, 254). 
Here, Buck-Morss provides a basis to begin to think about what we term as ‘the 
hyperimage’. The hyperimage relies on both technology and the body of its wielder, 
that is, the participant/producer whose immediate presence concretises the desired 
universal audience, and the portal through which the rest of that audience is deemed 
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to view the action. While Atlas carried the world on his back, citizen correspondents 
carry an (observing) world in their hands in the form of camera phones. Everyone 
makes images for everyone. As Deleuze (1986, 83) writes: ‘from the point of view of 
the human eye, montage is undoubtedly a construction, from the point of view of 
another eye, it ceases to be one; it is pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which 
would be in things.’  
In this respect, the hyperimage differs from the hyperreal in a number of key 
respects. The first point to make here is that we are so accustomed to hyperreality that 
when confronted by real images of events and processes that do threaten to consume 
us they appear as if fictionally rendered. The meaning of the image of the first Gulf 
War from the perspective of the camera mounted on a missile differs according to 
where it is viewed. As it poses no immediate or long-term threat, the image from the 
perspective of those watching it in the United States is indeed hyperreal. It is as if by 
framing it as a movie, the event ceases to be real or something perhaps imagined to be 
seen through the eyes of someone viewing it on YouTube in the safety of their home. 
The hyperreal in such respects functions as the mystification of reality. Irrespective of 
whether they identify the image as real or fiction, if somebody living in Bagdad now 
views the same image it will obviously have a different impact. The image poses 
either an immediate or an indirect threat to the person watching it and therefore it 
escapes being hyperreal and instead becomes a hyperimage. In other words, when 
what is depicted literally threatens (rather than an imagined threat) the territories 
hitherto unaffected by such events, that we are in the era of the hyperimage proper.  
The hyperimage is therefore an image that can potentially, or actually, escape 
its frame. In the early 1980s at the high point of the Cold War, The Day After and 
Threads, produced for US and UK television audiences respectively, depicted the 
19 
 
effect of a nuclear war on urban populations (Kansas in the US and Sheffield in the 
UK). The latter in particular was a highly plausible and, for this reason, an incredibly 
disturbing account of what it would be like to live in the aftermath of a nuclear war. 
Threads is a rare example of a film whose depiction of an apocalyptic scenario in a 
major centre of cultural production is so realistic and historically plausible that it can 
be considered a hyperimage. The less realistic, the less plausible and the more distant 
in time and or space, the more hyperreal the depiction is. As a result, the hyperimage 
is reality that must, to be rendered neutral, be ‘hyperrealised’. 
So, when disasters, traumas and catastrophes are relayed by observers using 
mobile devices and posted on YouTube, the images acquire a higher degree of 
authenticity that, when as spectacular as cinema, produces an uncanny effect. The 
miniaturisation of camera technologies embedded in mobile phones and typically at 
hand, along with Internet tools that enable the dissemination of raw footage without 
necessary reliance on the curation of traditional media industries, has given rise to a 
phenomenon that the early Soviet documentary filmmaker Dziga Vertov anticipated 
in his Kino-Eye manifesto. The aim of Kino-Eye was, according to Vertov, to ‘create 
an army of cine-observers and cine-correspondents (to move) away from the 
authorship of a single person to mass authorship, with the aim of organising a 
montage vision – not an accidental but a necessary and sufficient overview of the 
world every few hours’ (cf. Milne et al., 2012, 105). The dream has only now been 
realised. The world sees through the collective eye of millions of cine-correspondents. 
Hyperlinks and clips linked together by complex algorithms enable the cine-observer 
to organise their own montage vision of apocalyptic texts (although the options 
offered most prominently to them are not without mediation). Reality plays out ‘just 
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like the movies’ but, more to the point, reality is a movie, ideology objectified in 
montage by a common eye. 
It is at this point that we return to Bakhtin’s distinction between image and the 
symbolic. For, if everyone is indeed making images for everyone else, then an 
interesting possibility arises. Rather than the monoglossia of single-voiced images, we 
can begin to appreciate multi-voiced hyperimages for heteroglossic symbols to 
emerge in the cracks of the hyperreal. Today, these symbolic materials are refracted 
through digital culture and other everyday social and cultural forms. Not only are 
there images that are projections of disasters, these are now symbolised through 
unique ‘accents’ employing a plethora of technology and social forms that enact the 
social beyond mere images. These symbolic forms are not necessarily ‘hostile to the 
mythic, and frequently utilises its language’ (Bakhtin 1986, 169), but do so in 
different ways to test the limits of the hyperreal. As a result, the ‘thinglike 
environment’ constructed through monologic myths and the hyperreal are slowly 
impregnated by the ‘accents’ and ‘personality’ of others so that the ‘potential word 
and tone’ of a people’s history are revealed, which goes against monologic myths 
(Bakhtin 1986, 164). The Arab Spring, for example, captured to a large degree by 
amateur filmmakers and posted up on social media sites, shattered the monologic 
apocalyptic myth constructed by western politicians and mainstream media outlets 
that the Muslim world was a homogeneous mass comprised by dangerous elements 
who wished to end western civilisation. 
A dominant monologic force aiming for hegemony must therefore regulate 
such creative heteroglossic symbols. In the terms already spoken about, this would be 
a monologic power seeking to drain the hyperimage of any significance it might have 
in opening the spectacular images of the end times to ideological contestation. These 
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images must simply be consumed as one might consume a movie we see for 
entertainment. In this instance, monologic images are merged with popular 
heteroglossic symbols so that the creativity encapsulated in symbolic acts are 
personified in anonymous monologic meanings, voices and images. ‘“The voice of 
life itself”, “the voice of nature”, “the voice of the people”, “the voice of God”…’ 
(Bakhtin 1986, 163) are illustrations presented by Bakhtin of typical anonymous 
monological meanings, voices and images that seek to sweep up creative 
heteroglossic symbols to make the latter anonymous too. To return to a point we made 
earlier, in the modern world the most visible monologic force of unity is represented 
most typically through state power; a power where hegemonic forces will seek to 
penetrate heteroglossic culture and speak for it by ‘fusing “the language of 
(monologic) truth” with “the language of the everyday”’ (Bakhtin 1981, 315). The 
next section therefore starts to explore these issues in more depth. 
 
 
The material state of myths 
 
The increasing intrusion of the camera – the perennial third wheel – is illustrated by 
the publication of controversial pictures of Muammar Gaddafi taken as he was dying. 
At the time, Guardian writer Mark Lawson (2011) commented that,  
… the pictures of the terrified, wounded and then possibly dead Muammar 
Gaddafi used on TV bulletins and the print and online editions of newspapers 
in the last 24 hours seemed to me to be, by some distance, the most graphic 
and distressing representations we have ever seen of a recognisable individual 
during his final moments…The most significant (and probably irresistible) 
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change…is that the dissemination of contentious images has now largely left 
the desks of editors and regulators. Symbolically and crucially, the footage of 
Gaddafi’s capture and assault was shot not by a crew but by a crowd on 
cellphones. TV or newspaper editors who ethically decide to bin the most 
distressing images know, unlike their predecessors, that the views will be 
generally available elsewhere and that curiosity will draw a large part of the 
audience there. 
Hyperimages of individuals facing their own immanent mortality without hope of 
rescue make the coldly statistical theme of world apocalypse small and personal 
enough for viewers to enter the thresholds of the lives of others. Not only Gaddafi but 
also beheadings, the people falling to their death from the World Trade Center, the 
man kneeling in the sand his back to the oncoming 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami he 
knows to be inescapable.  
In one important respect, these apocalyptic hyperimages create myths that 
naturalise certain ideological relations. For instance, the politicisation of these images 
by the right is achieved through fear; if we do not want to die the way our favourite 
non-fictional characters do – the ones with the huge number of YouTube views – we 
must allow our regimes more power, more force in our name. The more common the 
terror, obsession, death wish or lurid display of genuinely threatening global 
warming, economic collapse or authoritarian violence that the hyperimage evokes, the 
more vivid, intense and unforgettable the hyperimage is the more it is deprived of 
intelligibility. Crises and catastrophes, imperialist warfare and fundamentalist 
violence are thus potentially rendered dead by apocalyptic images and spectacles.  
However, to retrieve a more critical perspective on these mythical images 
would require an alternative starting point to the one outlined by theorists such as 
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Baudrillard. For example, Baudrillard simply sees the political system as a hyperreal 
one mediated through the likes of opinion polls that simulate political questions and 
answers rather than open up a space for real antagonisms to flourish (Baudrillard 
1993, 67). As we have already indicated, an alternative critical perspective should 
seek to test the limits of hyperimages by teasing out the inherent inner dialectical 
quality of images, to show that they are refractions of symbolic and material social 
relations built on factors such as power, ideology, crisis and contradictions 
(Voloshinov 1973, 13). In terms of the apocalypse, rather than withdraw into the 
hyperreal, the task is to subject hyperimages to the heteroglossia of live intelligibility, 
to approach such images dialectically as symbolic refractions of material life. In this 
way, it becomes possible to challenge the hegemonic and visible expression of a 
dominant monologic hyperimage, one, in other words, domesticated when mistaken, 
perhaps even wilfully, for being just another instance of the hyperreal.  
Hobsbawm (2011, 324-327) writes that, ‘the basic problem of the revolution is 
how to make a hitherto subaltern class capable of hegemony, believe in itself as a 
potential ruling class and be credible as such to other classes… the struggle to turn the 
working class into a potential ruling class, the struggle for hegemony, must be waged 
before the transition of power, as well as during and after it’. The principal site of this 
ideological contestation is of course the state. As Gramsci observes:  
If political science means science of the State, and the State is the entire 
complex of practical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies 
and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those 
over whom it rules, then it is obvious that all the essential questions of 
sociology are nothing other than the questions of political science (Gramsci 




Unlike postmodern thinkers, for example Baudrillard, who tend to argue that it 
is a modernist error to think that a ‘real’ struggle still occurs over how a central force 
like the state regulates images in society, we think, in terms similar to Gramsci, it is 
crucial to hold onto a theory of the state when critically examining images and myths 
of the apocalypse. When one thinks about how wars are staged in the world today, it 
seems hardly a coincidence that an apocalyptical narrative is constructed by powerful 
states about, say, global terrorism, at the moment these very same governments move 
their military might into ‘failed states’ like Iraq to implement neoliberal agendas 
(Roberts 2010). In the words of James Davis: 
In part, for the mainstream right, immigrant scapegoating, along with attacks 
on multiculturalism and on the economic position of the working class, is an 
electoral strategy that puts the left and social democratic opposition of the 
defensive. In periods of economic decline and insecurity, fear generated 
around these cultural and social issues helps to obscure coherent critiques of 
economic life. Reproduced as state catastrophism they help to reinforce this 
fragmentation of the left’ (Davis 2012, 101). 
As Davis indicates, and as Marxists like Gramsci, along with critical thinkers like 
Foucault, make explicit, the state is not simply cut-off from the rest of society but 
establishes mechanisms of governance and ‘organic intellectuals’ in society in order 
to articulate a hegemonic project through everyday ‘cultural and social issues’.  
State and society therefore have a dialectical relationship with one another. 
Nicos Poulantzas is worth quoting at length on this fundamental point.  
Now, (a) We know that political strategy must be grounded on the autonomy 
of the organisations of the popular masses. But the attainment of such 
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autonomy does not involve the political organisations in leaving the strategic 
field of the relationship of forces that is the power-State, any more than it 
involves other organisations such as the trade unions in taking up a position 
outside the corresponding power mechanisms. To believe that this is even 
possible is an old illusion of anarchism (in the best sense of the term). 
Moreover, in neither case does self-organisation on the terrain of power imply 
that these organisations must directly insert themselves in the physical space 
of the respective institutions (this will depend on the conjuncture), nor a 
fortiori that they must embrace the materiality of these institutions (quite the 
contrary). (b) We also know that, alongside their possible presence in the 
physical space of the state apparatuses, the popular masses must constantly 
maintain and deploy centres and networks at a distance from these 
apparatuses: I am referring, of course, to movements for direct, rank-and-file 
democracy and to self-management networks. But although these take up 
political objectives, they are not located outside the State or, in any case, 
outside power – contrary to the illusions of anti-institutional purity. What is 
more, to place oneself at any cost outside the State in the thought that one is 
thereby situated outside power (which is impossible) can often be the best 
means of leaving the field open for statism: in short, it often involves a retreat 
in the face of the enemy precisely on this strategically crucial terrain 
(Poulantzas 2000 [1978], 153). 
 
Struggles to construct monologic hyperimages of the apocalypse must not 
therefore ignore, in our information age, the power of the state to control, govern, and 
regulate these hyperimages through hegemonic political projects (see also Roberts 
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2014). Genuine alternatives to what the aforementioned images present can thus also 
be fleshed out through such struggles. For Bakhtin and his colleagues, it is indeed 
vital that we take account of both dispersed heteroglossic accents and centralised 
monologic modes of regulation, such as hegemonic state projects. By recognising this 
relatively simple but important point, one becomes better equipped to challenge 
monologic myths and to dialogise them through progressive heteroglossic voices 
based in the contradictions of real material life. Indeed, the distance between media-
correspondent and media-observer is closing, the interval between perception and 
interpretation shortened to the point of being indiscernible and thus denotive. 
Discerned in the temporal and spatial voids that do still persist between the two are 
the faint echoes of class and social struggles and the possibility to amplify and 
concretise them through the clash of live accents on the streets, in the squares and in 
workplaces. They present the possibility to make abstract processes and relations of a 





One political danger is that the current slide towards authoritarianism in liberal 
democratic societies, especially the empowering of law and order to combat the 
perceived catastrophe of ‘global terrorism’, the seeming incapacity of the state to 
tame finance or corporate power, or the left to seize the reins of power, brings to the 
fore a sense of apocalyptic fatalism. Hardt and Negri warn of a leftist thinking which 
portrays the villain as an overwhelming political power, either sovereign or fascist, so 
that it seems ‘there are no forces of liberation inherent in such a power that, though 
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now frustrated and blocked, could be set free. There is no hope of transforming such a 
power on a democratic course. It needs to be opposed, destroyed, and that is all’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2009, 5). A void opens up to be populated by new apocalyptic 
myths. In this respect, capitalist crises spiral towards a point of abjection, 
desertification, radiated soils, dead zones from which nothing, not even fantasies, can 
emerge. 
The left today thus threatens to be consumed by its own belief in its capacity 
to change the world by bypassing the state, a position exemplified by global social 
movements, and exemplified, as we have argued, by certain postmodern strands of 
thought (cf. Cremin and Roberts 2011). There is, however, no autonomous space that 
has not already been commodified or subject to the law of surplus value, no individual 
that can persist except by its logic, and the state is required to develop this logic 
further in civil society through its regulation of money and law (Clarke 1988). Given 
the materially embedded nature of the capitalist state – that, as Poulantzas points out, 
condenses the broader social relations and ideologies that emanate from different 
spheres of influence and essentially the class struggle itself – it is thus a crucial terrain 
of contestation. As Leo Panitch (2014), writing in the Guardian, says,  
The left used to beat itself up, sometimes quite literally, with debates over 
reform vs revolution, parliamentarianism vs extra-parliamentarianism, party vs 
movement – as if one ruled out the other. The question for the 21st century is 
not reform v revolution, but rather what kinds of reforms, with what kinds of 
popular movements behind them engaging in the kinds of mobilisations that 
can inspire similar developments elsewhere, can prove revolutionary enough 




We would add that where apocalypses are generally revelatory and 
redemptive, capitalist apocalypses are contingent, the truths they expose are unlikely 
to lead to a world beyond capitalism. Revolutions differ in this respect. They are 
brought about by collective and self-conscious activity, not by some divine 
intervention. As Silver and Arrighi (2011) explain,   
… a long and deep period of systemic chaos – analogous but not identical to 
the systemic chaos of the first half of the twentieth century – remains a serious 
historical possibility. While the end of the long twentieth century is inevitable, 
there is nothing inevitable about it coming to a catastrophic ending. Avoiding 
the latter is our urgent collective task (Silver and Arrighi 2011, 68). 
This is not to deny that the decade of the ’00s was punctuated with political crises and 
images of human-engendered disaster in prosperous, developed countries: 9/11, the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the global financial crisis. The hyperimage 
functions as the condensation of the processes and events denoting an apocalyptic age 
in visual forms depicting and forewarning calamities that almost inevitably will 
consume or kill us if nothing is done about it. Almost inevitably: it’s in this narrow 
gap that the struggle for meaning occurs and where control of the meaning of 
hyperimages is of vital importance to the future of society.  
As we have argued, language for the Bakhtin Circle is rendered dead or 
monoglossic when refracted through the prism of a dominant ideology, but rendered 
alive when subjected to the heteroglossia of competing ‘accents’. ‘(A)t any given 
moment of its historical existence,’ Bakhtin explains, 
language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of 
socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between 
different epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the 
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present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily 
form. These “languages” of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of 
ways, forming new socially typifying “languages” (Bakhtin 1981, 291).  
The question for this paper has been whether the widely documented events, 
processes and relations, refracted in the phantasmagoria of media spectacle, that 
together denote an apocalyptic age, are the subject of live heterglossic intelligibility, 
or whether – through the monoglossia of the single accent which typically posits that 
there is no prospect to change the course of history – they have rendered the future 
already dead. Put another way, in the midst of capitalist abstraction concretised by 
economic crises and symptoms of anthropogenic 2  climatic change that echoes in 
every utterance, the political task is to bring the language of end times to life. The 
clash of live accents negates the monoglossia of economic liberalism alongside 
cynicism, resignation and fantasies of total collapse, to realise the possibility of a 
different future to that forewarned of by scientists, prescribed by economists, 
accommodated by politicians and made spectacle by the entertainment industry. What 
does this concretely entail? Competing accents on social media risk in an age of 
information overload becoming as Virilio said of the ‘information bomb’ mere 
fallout. Our conclusion is that the struggle for control of the image, an image that 
negates the cynicism of our ‘apocalyptic’ age, must necessarily occur on the terrain of 
the state. Moreover, and unlike our ‘post’-theorists, we still hold faith that Marxist 
theory can help us critically analyse myths of the apocalypse. As Fredric Jameson 
puts it: 
                                                        
2 This is a mystifying term given that it is not human life per se that has brought us to 
the brink of cataclysmic climate change but rather capitalist mode of production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption. A preferable term, albeit and inelegant one, 
to denote this ‘geological’ age is the Capitocene (Cremin 2015). 
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The point is that Marx alone sought to combine a politics of revolt with the 
‘poetry of the future’ and applied himself to demonstrate that socialism was 
more modern than capitalism and more productive. To recover that futurism 
and that excitement is surely the fundamental task of any left ‘discursive 
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